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Whether it concerns oil drilling or gold mining, sometimes a government, facing new 
circumstances, must change its mind. This reality creates a tension in law between 
encouraging stability and allowing adaptation to new information and new situations. The 
“gold rush” CAFTA lawsuits against El Salvador reveal this tension. 
 
Pacific Rim, a Canadian-based mining firm, has brought one of two gold mining lawsuits 
against El Salvador under CAFTA.110 Since the early 2000s, Pacific Rim has spent 
money looking for gold in El Salvador. It did so under exploration (but notably not 
exploitation) licences that were issued in 1996 and that Pacific Rim acquired in 2002. A 
few years later, after Pacific Rim decided where it wanted to dig, the government had 
adopted a more cautious position on gold mining. So, Pacific Rim has invoked its 
privilege – uniquely available to foreign investors under international law, via investment 
treaties – to sue El Salvador. It argues that the government should have allowed it to mine 
for gold; the government responds that Pacific Rim failed to satisfy steps in the approvals 
process, including an acceptable environmental assessment. Pacific Rim seeks at least 
US$ 77 million for its costs and hoped-for profits. 
 
El Salvador is a small, poor country with precariously few water resources. It lost 20% of 
its surface water in the past 20 years, and 95% of the rest is reportedly contaminated.111 
Industrial gold mining is a recent prospect for the country, and there are serious concerns 
about the risks it poses to people’s health and livelihoods, especially their access to clean 
water. 
 
How should the tension here between stability and change be resolved? 
On the one hand, it seems unfair that a company that put money into exploration should 
be frustrated when applying for permission to exploit what it has found. On the other 
hand, all mining companies must be aware that a government might change its approach 
over time to health and environmental risks of mining. If taxpayers had to compensate 
everyone who lost out in bets on the social or environmental feasibility of a project, this 
would disadvantage those who are more prudent, patient, or environmentally conscious. 
                                                 
* The author wishes to thank three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this chapter. It was 
first published as a Perspective on May 24, 2010. 
110 The second lawsuit is by U.S.-based Commerce Group Corporation. I focus on the Pacific Rim case here 
because there is more information publicly available about it. 
111 Richard Steiner, “El Salvador: gold, guns, and choice,” Report for the International Union for the 




The question of how the arbitrators in PacRim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador might resolve 
this tension is challenging to answer. Although not the fault of the arbitrators, it raises 
some important concerns. 
First, under CAFTA and other investment treaties, the constraints put on governments are 
both exceptionally potent and highly malleable. This makes it very important, and yet 
very difficult, to assess the legal standards that will apply in particular cases. In numerous 
awards to date, tribunals have interpreted provisions on expropriation, national treatment 
and fair and equitable treatment in starkly divergent ways. In turn, they have fuelled high-
stakes uncertainty in the evaluation of policy space and litigation risk. 
 
Second, investment treaties rely on the remedy of damages in cases often stemming from 
difficult judgment calls by governments in complex areas of policy. This can put 
arbitrators in a bind. Do they order a state to pay damages after finding that it violated an 
unclear rule? Or do they dismiss the claim, leaving the investor reeling after a long, 
expensive arbitration? Compared to other forms of public law judging, the system gives 
few options to respond to government conduct that is characterized, well after the fact, as 
unlawful. 
 
Third, the use of arbitrators instead of judges to decide basic tensions in public policy 
makes it essential that the process be credible and independent. However, investment 
treaty arbitration lacks key safeguards of independence that apply to courts, including 
security of tenure, an objective method of assigning judges to specific cases, and checks 
on income-earning activities outside of the judicial role. 
 
This invites unsavoury questions. What are the business interests of the arbitrators chosen 
to decide a case? With whom might they have a common outlook at the International 
Chamber of Commerce, ICSID and others that wield key powers over arbitrator 
appointments? By allowing the arbitration industry to make final decisions in matters of 
public law, investment treaties remove longstanding safeguards that protect judges from 
economic and financial entanglement and that ensure public confidence in the courts. 
 
How should governments respond? One option is to re-introduce a mediating role for 
domestic courts, including perhaps the courts of neutral states not involved in a specific 
dispute. Another is to look for ways to re-introduce safeguards of judicial independence, 
such as by designating a roster of eminent jurists, drawn from outside the commercial 
arbitration industry, from which arbitrators would be chosen. 
 
On the rules, governments could clarify that investment treaties are designed to offer an 
exceptional remedy in cases of serious abuse or targeted discrimination against a foreign 
investor, but not a wide-ranging opportunity to challenge general laws and policies. 
Nearly all government measures harm some people while helping others, not because this 
is the aim of the regulation but because all general decisions, by definition, have ripple 
effects across the economy and society. Requiring public compensation for those foreign 
investors who are “harmed” by a general measure skews markets, as well as regulation, 




There are various ways to address the lack of independence, fairness and coherence in 
investment treaty arbitration. But the root questions are familiar. How should the tension 
in law between stability and change be resolved, and by whom? 
